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A series of 9 search tasks corresponding to the Piagetian Stages 3–6 of object permanence were
administered to 11 common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus). Success rates varied strongly among tasks
and marmosets, but the performances of most subjects were above chance level on the majority of tasks
of visible and invisible displacements. Although up to 24 trials were administered in the tests, subjects
did not improve their performance across trials. Errors were due to preferences for specific locations or
boxes, simple search strategies, and attentional deficits. The performances of at least 2 subjects that
achieved very high scores up to the successive invisible displacement task suggest that this species is able
to represent the existence and the movements of unperceived objects.
Interactions with moving objects are crucial for the survival of
many organisms. In a context in which important objects like a
mate, a predator, or a prey appears, disappears, and reappears, the
interactions require functional invariants. In particular, animals
that move efficiently through a structured environment in three
dimensions of space, like primates, must be equipped with a
capacity to recognize the important object as being the same
through its repeated appearances over time. If an object has dis-
appeared, leaving no traces or perceptual cues to rely on, the
search problem requires a solution on an abstract level (Dumas &
Wilkie, 1995). Such an abstract “trace” would be a representation
of the absent target object in memory. Although it is known that a
wide variety of animals can maintain a representation of an object
that has disappeared from view, psychologists’ understanding of
which information is extracted from this event and their knowl-
edge of which animals use which information to keep track of the
object are far from complete.
Animals achieve different levels of abstraction, that is, different
levels of understanding that objects are independent of their own
action and are distinct entities in time and space (see overviews in
Antinucci, 1989; Dore´ & Dumas, 1987; Hauser, 2000). Piaget’s
(1937/1954) theory of object permanence provides a heuristic
conceptual tool to investigate how animals solve such representa-
tional problems. Object permanence is the last perceptual and the
first conceptual invariant: Objects are unified across the spatial and
temporal discontinuities of their perceptual appearance; hence,
they are constructed as independent from the subject’s own per-
ceptions. Object permanence allows a subject to understand that
objects continue to exist, even when they are no longer available
for immediate perception through time and space. Because detailed
descriptions of the various stages of the sensorimotor period and
the tasks for which solutions involve those types of cognitive skills
can be found in several reviews (Antinucci, 1989; Dore´ & Dumas,
1987; Etienne, 1984; Parker & Gibson, 1979; Uzgiris & Hunt,
1975), a brief summary is sufficient here (see Table 1).
Piaget’s theory has proved useful as a framework for compar-
ative studies (Etienne, 1984; Pepperberg & Funk, 1990). Piagetian
procedures are effective in cross-species comparisons because the
methodology involves very detailed observations (similar to etho-
logical procedure) and the target activities can be done by non-
verbal, action-oriented subjects (Funk, 1996). Furthermore, the
concept of object permanence has proved to be of particular
importance in nonhuman animals because of its potential ecolog-
ical advantages in the lives of many species (Dumas, 1992; Eti-
enne, 1984). The ecological relevance of the visible displacement
tasks is most obvious. Animals watch prey or conspecifics moving
and disappearing behind obstacles. For invisible displacement
tasks, the ecological relevance is less obvious. Animals may en-
counter situations in which they have to make inferences about the
unperceived movements of an object. To cite an example from de
Blois, Novak, and Bond (1998), a male marmoset may hear the
vocalizations of his female and turn his head in the direction of the
noise. Meanwhile, the female continues to move in the canopies.
When the male looks at the location where the female was, he no
longer sees her but only some conspicuously moving branches.
Shortly thereafter he sees other branches moving some distance
away. In this situation, it would be useful if the male understood
that the female continued to move while he was not looking for her
and inferred where she might be on the basis of indirect cues of her
movement.
Most studies on object permanence in animals have been con-
ducted in nonhuman primates, such as chimpanzees (Pan troglo-
dytes: Mathieu, Bouchard, Granger, & Herscovitch, 1976; Potı` &
Spinozzi, 1994; Wood, Moriarty, Gardner, & Gardner, 1980),
gorillas (Gorilla gorilla: Natale, Antinucci, Spinozzi, & Poti,
1986; Redshaw, 1978), orangutans (Pongo pygmeus: Call, 2001;
de Blois et al., 1998), gibbons (Hylobates lar: Snyder, Birchette, &
Achenbach, 1978), rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulata: de Blois &
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Novak, 1994; Snyder et al., 1978; Wise, Wise, & Zimmerman,
1974), Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata: Natale et al., 1986),
and stump-tailed macaques (Macaca arctoides: Parker, 1977).
Only a small number of those examined belonged to the New
World monkeys, such as cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus:
Hauser, Williams, Kralik, & Moskovitz, 2001; Santos, Ericson, &
Hauser, 1999); two Cebus species, the tufted (white-throated)
capuchin (Cebus capucinus: Mathieu et al., 1976; Snyder et al.,
1978) and the brown capuchin (Cebus apella: Dumas & Brunet,
1994; Schino, Spinozzi, & Berlinguer, 1990; Snyder et al., 1978;
Spinozzi, 1989); yellow-tailed woolly monkeys (Lagothrica flavi-
cauda: Mathieu et al., 1976); squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus:
de Blois et al., 1998; Vaughter, Smotherman, & Ordy, 1972); and
slender lories (Loris tardigradus: Jolly, 1964).
Both New World and Old World monkeys solve visible
displacement problems. However, whether both groups are also
able to comprehend invisible displacement problems is an issue
of current debate. Whereas earlier studies have reported suc-
cessful responses in rhesus macaques (Wise et al., 1974), squir-
rel monkeys (Vaughter et al., 1972), 1 stump-tailed macaque
(Parker, 1977), and 1 capuchin monkey (Mathieu et al., 1976),
more recent studies have drawn the competences of these spe-
cies into question. With the exception of a study with rhesus
monkeys (Fillion, Washburn, & Gulledge, 1996) in which they
showed the ability to infer the hidden movement in a comput-
erized task, compelling evidence for the ability to solve the
invisible displacement task is lacking. On the basis of experi-
ments with rhesus monkeys (de Blois & Novak, 1994) and
squirrel monkeys (de Blois et al., 1998), de Blois and coauthors
(de Blois & Novak, 1994; de Blois et al., 1998) concluded that
the ability to mentally represent unperceived events is shared by
humans and great apes but not monkeys.
However, de Blois and coauthors (de Blois & Novak, 1994; de
Blois et al., 1998) remained cautious about adopting a dichoto-
mous view of the distribution of cognitive skills in primates. They
instead recommended that attention be given to the lesser apes to
gain a more accurate understanding of the distribution and the
evolution of cognitive skills in nonhuman primates. Additionally,
Tomasello and Call (1997) recognized that “any general hypoth-
eses about the object permanence skills of primates will remain
premature until more research is done with . . . marmosets and
tamarins (of the New World monkeys)” (p. 42). In fact, the genus
Cebus with its extraordinary manipulative abilities and its skillful
foraging, which involves a detached object as a pounding tool
(Antinucci & Visalberghi, 1986; Parker & Gibson, 1977), might
not be representative of New World monkeys. Therefore, it would
be interesting to explore the searching abilities in a species of the
family Callithricidae, monkeys that forage mainly on fruits and
plant exudates.
Common marmosets are studied on a wide scale of topics,
including both cognitive and neuronal issues. We focused on
social learning competencies, such as imitative learning (Bugn-
yar & Huber, 1997; Voelkl & Huber, 2000) and cooperation
(Werdenich & Huber, 2002). Studies by Bugnyar and Huber
(1997), Voelkl and Huber (2000), and Werdenich and Huber
(2002) incorporated artificial foraging tasks that required both
manipulative and representational abilities. Neuroscientists
have been interested in the relationship between simple problem
solving and the prefrontal cortex. Using a number of hidden
object retrieval tasks as tests of inhibition, Dias, Robbins, and
Roberts (1996) provided some evidence that marmosets are able
to retrieve fully occluded objects (see also Wallis, Dias, Rob-
bins, & Roberts, 2001). These findings, together with the fact
that the subjects in our laboratory are well trained on long and
close interactions with human experimenters, compelled us to
look more closely into the above-mentioned abilities in com-
mon marmosets.
Therefore, the purpose of the present research was to assess as
accurately as possible the level of object permanence that is
displayed in the behavior of marmosets and to analyze their search
activities. Object permanence is essentially assessed through stan-
dardized visible and invisible displacement tests, in which subjects
have to search for and find occluded objects (De´carie, 1965;
Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975). In these tests, the standard testing proce-
dure involves the use of a number of screens—in our study
three—behind which an object that the subject will have to search
for can be hidden. We administered five visible and four invisible
displacement tests.
Table 1
Summary of the Stages of Object Permanence Development (After de Blois et al., 1998)
Stage Description
1 and 2 No search for hidden objects. Infants stare at their point of disappearance.
3 Infants can retrieve a partly hidden object.
4a Infants can retrieve a totally hidden object if they initiated search before the object was
completely hidden.
4b Infants can retrieve a totally hidden object, but they persist searching a previously rewarded
screen even if they saw the object disappear behind a new screen (perseveration of “A not B”
error).
5a Infants overcome the perseveration error, and they can find an object that was hidden behind a
different screen on every trial.
5b Infants can find an object that was hidden behind various screens within the same trial.
6a Infants can find an object that was invisibly hidden behind a different screen on every trial.
6b Infants can find an object that was invisibly hidden behind various screens within the same trial.
Note. From “Object Permanence in Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and Squirrel Monkeys (Saimiri sciureus),”
by S. T. de Blois, M. A. Novak, and M. Bond, 1998, Journal of Comparative Psychology, 112, p. 138. Copyright
1998 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission of the author.
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Method
Subjects
The subjects were 11 adult common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), of
which 4 were maintained in two family groups at the Institute of Zoology,
University of Vienna, Austria, and 7 were maintained in two family groups
at the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research,
Altenberg, Austria. Age, sex, rearing history, and number of offspring are
given in Table 2. All marmosets were born in captivity. They were naive
to the object permanence tasks at the onset of the experiment, although
some had been used in social learning or cooperation experiments before
(Bugnyar & Huber, 1997; Voelkl & Huber, 2000; Werdenich & Huber,
2002). At the Institute of Zoology, both groups lived in identical indoor
cages (250  250  250 cm) that were attached to outdoor cages of the
same size. At the Konrad Lorenz Institute, both groups lived in identical
indoor cages (200  350  300 cm). At both places, Vienna and Alten-
berg, we used an experimental cage (135  37  37 cm) to test the
animals. These cages were connected with the home cage by a wire mesh
tunnel, through which the marmosets could be lured individually by a piece
of banana. The home cages were equipped with branches, ropes, and living
plants. All marmosets were fed fruits, vegetables, monkey pellets, and
protein supplements. The exception was bananas, a very attractive type of
food for the common marmosets, which were never provided as part of the
daily diet during the experiments. The temperature was 26–30 °C during
the day and 21–23 °C at night. The humidity was approximately 70%–
80%. In summer, daylight was the main source of lighting, whereas in
winter, additional UV-fluorescent tubes were used to maintain a 12-hr
light–dark cycle.
Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of a static wooden platform (40 cm wide  4
cm high 50 cm long) that was fixed to the iron mesh of the experimental
cage and a thin Plexiglas board of equal surface size that could be moved
on the wooden platform back and forth (see Figure 1). Three identical blue
plastic boxes (2.5 cm wide  2.0 cm high  2.5 cm long) were placed on
this board in a row with 10 cm between them. These boxes allow a small
piece of very attractive food (Nestle´ Trios breakfast cereals; C.P.A Cereal
Partners, Vienna, Austria) to be hidden inside them. A small plastic
cylinder (1.7 cm high, with a 2.7-cm diameter) was used as a container
during invisible displacements. It was placed on the left, remote corner of
the Plexiglas board, from the monkey’s point of view.
Procedure
The marmosets received nine tests of object permanence, of which five
(Tasks 1–5) involved visible displacements and four (Tasks 6–9) involved
invisible displacements. Tasks 1–7 and 9 were similar to Tasks 1–8 of the
study by de Blois and Novak (1994), who tested object permanence in
rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), and Task 8 was designed after the study
by Gagnon and Dore´ (1993), who tested search behavior in invisible
displacement problems in dogs (Canis familiaris).
Before the onset of the experiment, the monkeys were presented with
food objects behind obstacles and under boxes to make them familiar with
the necessary manipulations to recover food. These manipulations were
also part of previous experiments on stimulus enhancement and social
facilitation. Generally, all four family groups in Vienna and Altenberg had
been confronted with learning tasks for years, of which most involved
manipulations of objects and tools. Before the onset of the experiment, they
were randomly assigned to two groups that differed in the order of
presentation of the tests. Group 1 consisted of 2 monkeys from Vienna and
4 monkeys from Altenberg. Group 2 consisted of 2 monkeys from Vienna
and 3 monkeys from Altenberg (see Table 2). In Group 1, the marmosets
received the visible displacement tests first, followed by the invisible
displacement tests (i.e., Tests 1–5 first and then Tests 6–9). In Group 2, the
order of tests was reversed (i.e., Tests 6–9 before Tests 1–5). Counterbal-
ancing the order of tests was based on a statement from Gagnon and Dore´
(1992), in which invisible displacement tests in dogs were more successful
if they were preceded by visible displacement tests. If this is also true for
marmosets, Group 1 should outperform Group 2.
A daily session began with the separation of 1 marmoset from the group
by luring it into the experimental cage. After a short familiarization period
(usually less than 5 min), the test was administered in a face-to-face
interaction with the experimenter (Natacha Mendes) standing behind the
apparatus in front of the cage and the subject. The experimenter avoided
giving any cues to the subjects as much as possible, for instance, by
fixating on a point in the center of the wooden platform during the subject’s
choice. (The problem of experimenter’s cuing in face-to-face procedures is
discussed in a number of similar Piagetian experiments, like those by
Gagnon & Dore´, 1992; Pepperberg & Funk, 1990; and Pepperberg &
Kozak, 1986.)
The tests included either 9, 12, or 24 trials (see below). These numbers
resulted from a compromise between statistical requirements and the
avoidance of empirical learning. In all tests, the three boxes were present.
The target (i.e., baited) box on the subject’s right side was labeled Box A,
the one in the middle was labeled Box B, and the one on the subject’s left
Table 2










Pooh VIE 1 2 3 M MR 2
Theresa VIE 1 2 2 F MR 0
Shuto VIE 2 1 16 M MR 4
Vitus VIE 2 1 6 M MR 0
Dublett ALT 3 1 8 F MR 2
Diabolo ALT 3 1 7 M MR 0
Bianca ALT 3 1 6 F MR 0
Carunt ALT 3 1 6 M HR 0
Devil ALT 4 2 7 M MR 0
Mandela ALT 4 2 5 F MR 0
Niko ALT 4 2 5 F MR 0
Note. VIE  Vienna, Austria; ALT  Altenberg, Austria; M  male; F  female; HR  hand reared; MR 
reared by the mother.
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side was labeled Box C. At the beginning of a trial, the experimenter
waited until the subject moved to the wire mesh where the apparatus was
fixed. As soon as the subject paid attention to the target object, the
experimenter hid it in one of the boxes as specified below (test descrip-
tions). The experimenter’s manipulations were stopped if the subject lost
attention and were continued when the subject paid attention again. A
monkey’s action was scored as a response if it touched a box; if it pushed
the baited box, it was scored as a correct response, and if it did not, it was
scored as an incorrect response (except in Test 9; see the Results section).
The next trial followed immediately. In most cases, the monkeys responded
within 10 s. When subjects failed to respond after 20 s, the trial was
interrupted and restarted. The session for a monkey was stopped and
continued on the next day if the subject did not make a response within 1
min. Daily sessions for each monkey lasted for approximately 5 min, in
which time up to 8 trials could be administered. Incomplete tests were
completed on the following day.
Test 1: Single visible displacement. The reward was hidden in full
view by the experimenter (Natacha Mendes). She first held the food reward
in full view of the subject, then moved it above the board, lifted the target
box with one hand, dropped it with the other hand, and finally hid it with
the target box from above. Then, the Plexiglas board was moved toward the
wire mesh after the manipulations were completed to allow the monkey to
make a response. The subjects received 12 trials. The time interval between
each trial was approximately 8 s. Six subjects (Theresa, Pooh, Diabolo,
Carunt, Dublett, and Bianca) saw the visible hiding process under Box A,
and the other 5 subjects (Shuto, Vitus, Devil, Niko, and Mandela) saw the
visible hiding process under Box C.
Test 2: Sequential visible displacement. Immediately after the last trial
of the preceding test, the subjects saw the experimenter place the object in
a different box for nine trials. Those subjects that experienced Box A as the
hiding box in Test 1 now saw the food reward disappearing under Box C,
and vice versa.
Test 3: Alternate single visible displacement. Each subject received 3
trials in a row in which first Box B, then Box C, and finally Box A were
used as target boxes. Because each subject received eight repetitions of the
BCA sequence, this test involved 24 trials.
Test 4: Successive visible displacements with two target boxes. Within
a single trial, the food reward was hidden two times; it was removed from
the first visited box and moved in full view of the subject into the target
box before the subject could make a response. We used a predetermined
order of succession of visited boxes for all subjects in a series of six trials:
BA, AB, CA, AC, BC, and CB. These six trials were repeated four times.
Test 5: Successive visible displacement with three target boxes. Before
hiding the reward in the target box, the experimenter hid and removed it
from the other two boxes. The predetermined order of succession of three
visited boxes in a series of six trials was the following for all subjects:
CBA, BAC, ACB, CAB, ABC, and BCA. We repeated this sequence four
times. However, the fourth repetition was altered for control reasons:
Although the third box was touched and lifted, the reward was hidden
under the second box visited. This control procedure determined if the
marmosets searched under the last box visited by the experimenter instead
of under the target box.
Test 6: Single invisible displacement. First, the reward was visibly
hidden under the transport container. Then, the container was moved to the
rear side (from the point of view of the subject) of the target box, which
was then lifted about 1 cm on its rear side, and the food was pushed inside.
Afterward, the transport container was shown empty to the subject and
brought to its initial position. Box A was the target box for 6 subjects
(Diabolo, Carunt, Dublett, Bianca, Theresa, and Pooh), and Box C was the
target box for the other 5 subjects (Devil, Niko, Mandela, Shuto, and
Vitus). This procedure was repeated for 12 trials.
Test 7: Sequential invisible displacement. This test followed the logic
of Test 2. Immediately after the last trial of Test 6, the target boxes were
exchanged between the two groups. Nine trials were conducted with the
altered target box.
Test 8: Side-by-side invisible displacement. The piece of food was put
on the Plexiglas board next to the wire mesh and then pushed with the
transport container (side by side) to the front side (from the monkey’s point
of view) of the target box. Then the experimenter continued to push the
food with the transport container to the rear side (i.e., the invisible side
from the monkey’s point of view) of the target box, which was then lifted
about 1 cm on the rear side, and the food was pushed inside. Then the
transport container was shown to be empty to the subject and placed at its
initial position. Box A was the target box for 6 subjects (Diabolo, Carunt,
Dublett, Bianca, Theresa, and Pooh), and Box C was the target box for the
other 5 subjects (Devil, Niko, Mandela, Shuto, and Vitus). Each subject
received 24 trials. The aim of this test, created by Gagnon and Dore´ (1993),
was to investigate the relation among food object, container, and target
box.
Test 9: Successive invisible displacement with two target boxes. Ac-
cording to the logic of Test 4, the food reward was hidden successively in
two boxes, but this time the experimenter used the invisible displacement
procedure. We used a predetermined order of succession of visited boxes
for all subjects in a series of four trials: AB, BA, CA, and AC. This
sequence of four trials was repeated four times. Thereafter, eight trials were
presented in which all three boxes were visited. After the reward was left
under the second box visited, the empty container was shown to the
monkey and then moved to the third box before being placed in its initial
position. Four sequences, repeated two times, were used: ABC, BAC,
CAB, and ACB. Again, these control trials were conducted to control for
the search strategy of going to the last box visited by the container.
Responses were marked as correct if the subjects pushed the target box
(where the reward was hidden) and retrieved the food reward. In addition,
we used a second scoring method for Test 9, after de Blois and Novak
(1994; Experiment 2); responses were marked as correct if the subject
made one of two choices: (a) It chose the target box directly (called direct
responses), or (b) it chose first the box initially visited by the experimenter
and then the target box. Correspondingly, a trial was scored as incorrect if
the monkey either (a) chose the incorrect box on its first search or (b) chose
the first box visited and then the incorrect box.
The subjects’ responses were immediately noted on prepared data sheets.
All sessions were videotaped for a post hoc detail analysis.
Figure 1. Schematic drawing of the experimental cage and the wooden
platform with three boxes in frontal view.
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Results
Motivation
All marmosets were interested in searching for the food object
by reaching through the wire mesh partition and lifting one of the
three boxes. Although some sessions had to be terminated and
restarted on the following day because of a loss of interest, on the
whole, the monkeys were equally motivated throughout the nine
tests (for each subject, between four and eight sessions had to be
terminated and restarted). On average, each test required less than
two sessions to be administered.
Test Performance
Overall, the 11 subjects chose the correct box in 933 of a total
of 1,782 trials (52.36%). Because there was great variation in the
number of successful trials across subjects and tests, we examined
the influence of the two bivariate factors, location (Vienna and
Altenberg) and sequence, that is, the order of presentation of the
tests. A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test revealed that the data approach
a normal distribution for factor location (Vienna, Z  .557, p 
.92; Altenberg, Z  .766, p  .60) and for factor sequence
(Sequence 1, Z  .608, p  .85; Sequence 2, Z  .642, p .81).
A 2  2 (Location  Sequence) multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) on the total number of successful trials was con-
ducted. The results revealed no significant effect of location, F(1,
95)  1.98, or sequence, F(1, 95)  0.09.
Because the subjects were always confronted with three possible
choices, the probability of getting a correct response by chance can
be assumed to be p  1/3. In Table 3, the number of correct
responses of each subject in each test is shown; the number of
trials and the theoretical value expected from assuming that the
subjects were purely guessing are shown in Table 4. The expec-
tation values () are derived from the binomial distribution, being
the product of k (the sample size, here the number of trials) and p
(the probability of choosing the baited box by chance). Note, for
Test 9, we used here only direct responses (see the Procedure
section, Test 9). The binomial test can then be applied to evaluate
if the individual’s score in each test was significantly higher than
the score expected by chance. In particular, we asked what is the
probability of obtaining values as extreme or more extreme than
the observed value when we assume the data are generated by pure
guessing (Siegel & Castellan, 1988).
An analysis of the subjects’ individual performances in the nine
tests revealed high variation among tests and among subjects.
Overall, the binomial tests used for the subjects’ individual data
revealed that the subjects produced very improbable scores in
nearly half of all cases (in 43 of 99 cases). Cases in which the
binomial tests revealed a significant deviation from chance are
indicated in Table 3 by bold numbers. From inspection of Table 3,
it is evident that the subjects varied in their success rates generated
in the nine object permanence tasks. However, the interindividual
variation in performance is particularly high only if we take the
numbers of significant scores as criterion but not if we take the
sum of correct choices in all nine tests (see Table 5). Although the
numbers of tests in which the individuals performed significantly
above chance varied between one (Niko) and eight (Theresa), all
subjects with the exception of 1 (Devil: 35.8%) achieved signifi-
cant total scores (range: 39.5%–67.3%). The 2 most successful
monkeys (Theresa and Pooh) produced scores of correct choices
significantly higher than expected by chance in eight and seven
tests, respectively. Over all tests, they chose the correct box twice
as much as would be expected if they were guessing.
To compare the tests according to their difficulties for the
common marmosets, we assessed two measures: the numbers of
subjects that showed significant scores and the sum of correct
choices from all 11 marmosets. With respect to the numbers of
subjects with significant scores, Test 2 was the easiest and Tests 5
and 9 were the most difficult. In five tests (Tests 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9),
less than half of the monkeys were successful. Five subjects
showed extreme numbers of correct choices in Test 1, 7 in Test 2,
6 in Test 3, 4 in Test 4, 2 in Test 5, 3 in Test 6, 3 in Test 7, 6 in
Test 8, and 2 in Test 9. Thus, we found considerable variation in
the numbers of successful marmosets among tests, ranging from 2
to 9.
Table 3
Number of Correct Choices for Each Subject in Each Test
Subject Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 Test 7 Test 8 Test 9
Bianca 8 6 10 11 8 11 1 22 10
Carunt 10 9 12 10 3 3 2 21 9
Devil 5 3 14 13 6 6 2 1 7
Diabolo 6 7 15 10 12 7 1 22 12
Dublett 7 7 16 11 14 7 3 22 10
Mandela 5 5 17 15 10 7 6 6 10
Niko 8 5 11 10 7 6 4 3 9
Pooh 10 2 20 15 10 11 6 14 19
Shuto 3 6 12 10 10 7 5 11 8
Theresa 11 6 17 15 13 10 1 17 14
Vitus 3 9 10 7 12 4 7 4 7
M 6.9 5.9 14.0 11.5 9.5 7.2 3.5 13.0 10.4
SD 2.8 2.2 3.3 2.6 3.3 2.6 2.3 8.4 3.6
Note. Numbers in bold typeface indicate significant deviation from chance ( p  1/3) to higher frequencies
according to the binomial distribution. In Test 9 only direct responses are used (see the text for more
information).
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However, if we measure the group performance in each test by
taking the sum of correct choices from the whole group of subjects,
this variation disappears. Only for Test 7 (38 correct choices out of
99 trials; ns), we cannot reject the null hypothesis (that the differ-
ences are due to chance alone). But, even in Test 4 (127 correct
choices out of 264 trials; p  .02), Test 5 (105 correct choices out
of 264 trials; p  .02), Test 6 (79 correct choices out of 132 trials;
p  .01), and Test 9 (114 correct choices out of 264 trials; p 
.01), the binomial tests revealed significance. In those four tests,
more subjects showed scores above the chance level (10, 7, 9, and
7 subjects, respectively) than would be predicted by pure chance.
With the exception of Test 7, the common marmosets produced
significant scores as a group, with small differences between tests.
This fact is illustrated in Figure 2, in which the group performance
in each test is shown as mean plus standard deviation of the
relative scores. The highest rates were found in Tests 2 (65.7%)
and 4 (60.2%), and the lowest rates in Tests 7 (38.4%) and 5
(39.8%). The individual variation is particularly high in Test 8 (the
side-by-side invisible displacement task), ranging from 1 to 22
correct responses out of 24 trials.
To make a more general statement about the marmosets’ abili-
ties in object permanence tasks, we conducted group analyses by
using one-sample t tests. Although the hypothetical distribution of
random guessing is not a t distribution for such small numbers of
trials, one-tailed t tests are sometimes used in the literature (e.g., de
Blois & Novak, 1994; de Blois et al., 1998; Gagnon & Dore´, 1993)
to evaluate the hypothesis that the average number of correct trials
in each test is significantly higher than the average number of
correct trials expected by chance. The t tests revealed that the
marmosets performed significantly above chance level on all vis-
ible displacement tests except Test 5: Test 1, t(10) 3.48, p .01;
Test 2, t(10)  4.46, p  .01; Test 3, t(10)  6.06, p  .01; Test
4, t(10)  9.32, p  .01; Test 5, t(10)  1.55, p  .08. Two out
of four invisible displacement tasks also did not pose serious
problems to the marmosets: Test 6, t(10)  4.06, p  .01; Test 8,
t(10) 1.99, p .04. In contrast, performance on Test 7 remained
at the chance level: t(10)  0.67, p  .26.
As mentioned above, the performance on Test 9 was analyzed in
two different manners. First, we evaluated the performance by
counting the number of responses that were immediately directed
to the target box (direct responses). A one-sample t test evaluating
whether the mean of those scores is higher than the value expected
by chance (8) reveals significance, t(10)  2.20, p  .03. Second,
as suggested by de Blois and Novak (1994), two distinct responses
can be scored as correct. These responses were choosing the target
box directly with a probability of 1/3 or choosing the first box
touched by the experimenter and then selecting the baited box with
a probability of 1/6 (1/3  1/2). Therefore, the combined proba-
bility of making a correct response on the double invisible dis-
placement task is 1/2 (1/3  1/6). A one-sample t test evaluating
whether the mean of those second scores of the 11 marmosets is
higher than the value expected by chance (this time 12) approaches
significance, t(10)  1.72, p  .06.
One objection that can be made to the experimental findings is
that because we tested the marmosets in up to 24 trials, it becomes
possible that empirical learning occurred (see, e.g., de Blois &
Novak, 1994, and Dore` & Dumas, 1987, for discussion). With
repeated exposure to the task, a monkey may simply learn that the
object can be found among the hiding locations and use discrim-
inative stimuli (e.g., the location the experimenter visited) or rules
Table 4
Number of Trials (N), Theoretical Values Expected From
Assuming That the Subjects Were Purely Guessing (), and
Standard Deviations () for Each Test
Test N  
1 12 4 1.6
2 9 3 1.4
3 24 8 2.3
4 24 8 2.3
5 24 8 2.3
6 12 4 1.6
7 9 3 1.4
8 24 8 2.3
9 24 8 2.3
Table 5










Bianca 5 16 93 57.41 .01
Carunt 4 14 82 50.62 .01
Devil 2 13 58 35.80 .28
Diabolo 4 13 95 58.64 .01
Dublett 5 16 101 62.35 .01
Mandela 3 13 81 50.00 .01
Niko 1 15 64 39.51 .06
Pooh 7 15 109 67.28 .01
Shuto 2 17 78 48.15 .01
Theresa 8 17 106 65.43 .01
Vitus 2 14 66 40.74 .03
Note. All subjects participated in nine tests, consisting of a total of 162 trials. Those nine tests required
different numbers of sessions because sometimes sessions had to be terminated and restarted on the following
day. The numbers of correct choices are given both as absolute and as relative scores. p  the probability of
obtaining values as extreme or more extreme than the observed value when guessing is assumed, according to
the binomial distribution. In Test 9, only direct responses are used (see the text for more information).
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(e.g., searching at the last location the experimenter visited) to
determine where to search. If a monkey understands that an object
still exists after it has disappeared, it ought to search for it spon-
taneously. We therefore recalculated the proportion of correct
choices by focusing on the first 6 trials in each test. As is evident
from inspection of the open bars in Figure 2, however, this mea-
sure hardly alters the previous findings. The marmosets were fairly
constant in their choice behavior across trials, with performance
being as good in the first few trials as at the end of a test. Rule
learning or adaptation to the task can thus be ruled out as an
explanation for good test performances.
We gained further understanding about the specific search strat-
egies of the marmosets by analyzing the performance in the control
trials of Tests 5 and 9. These controls helped to determine whether
the marmosets searched under the last box visited by the experi-
menter. The marmosets had great difficulties solving the 6 control
trials of Test 5. On average, they failed in 3.52 trials (range: 2–6).
However, those failures were not restricted to the last box visited
but were roughly equally distributed across the two unbaited
boxes. This indicates that the subjects were confused by the
experimenter visiting three instead of two boxes and that they did
not adopt an alternative search strategy.
In the eight control trials in which the experimenter visited all
three boxes in Test 9, roughly the same proportions of errors as in
the normal trials occurred. We also compared the subjects’ per-
formance in AB and AC trials in Test 9. Some recent studies (e.g.,
Call, 2001) suggest that AB trials are much easier than AC trials.
This is also true in our marmosets. Whereas the group average is
2.18 correct (direct) responses in AB trials, it is only 0.82 in AC
trials. It is interesting to note that the 2 subjects with the highest
scores across all tests (Pooh and Theresa) showed no difference in
performance in AB and AC trials (Pooh: 4 correct responses in
both AB and AC trials; Theresa: 2 correct responses in both AB
and AC trials).
Search Strategies in Double Displacement Tasks
In addition to the analysis of correct choices, we investigated
search strategies and preferences for specific locations. We exam-
ined the frequency with which the monkeys were engaged in
different types of search in Tests 4 and 9, in which the container
was successively brought into two boxes. According to de Blois
and Novak (1994), a direct search consists of looking in the correct
box immediately, a sequential search of looking in the box first
visited by the experimenter and then in the correct box, and an
irrelevant search in all other cases.
In Test 4, we presented the sequence BA, AB, CA, AC, BC, and
CB four times. If a subject would have shown a total preference for
one specific location (e.g., the box in the middle, Box B), it would
have given 8 direct responses (in this example, the monkeys would
have succeeded on AB and CB displacements), 4 sequential re-
sponses (they would have succeeded by chance on half of BA and
BC displacements), and 12 irrelevant responses (they would have
succeeded on AC and CA displacements and, by chance, on half of
BA and BC displacements).
Instead of determining the exact probabilities for specific
choices, we performed a chi-square test for goodness of fit with
two degrees of freedom. The test investigates how well the distri-
bution of the obtained data fit the theoretical distribution, that is,
the distribution generated by a preference for one specific location.
Chi-square values and statistical probabilities for Tests 4 and 9 are
shown in Tables 6 and 7, respectively.
In Test 4, the obtained distribution of choices deviates signifi-
cantly from the theoretical distribution for 3 subjects (Pooh,
Theresa, and Mandela). These subjects gave direct responses
nearly twice as often as would be expected if the subjects had been
searching systematically at one specific location on their first
choice. The other 8 subjects showed no significant deviation from
Figure 2. Mean ( SD) percentage of correct responses in each of the nine presented tests. Black bars indicate
performance shown in all trials of a session, whereas open bars indicate the performance shown in only the first
six trials in each test.
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the search pattern that would have resulted from a total preference
for one specific location.
In Test 9, we used a predetermined order of succession of boxes
for all subjects in a series of only four trials: AB, BA, CA, and AC.
This sequence of four trials was repeated six times (during the last
two times, the third container was lifted for control reasons).
Therefore, if a subject preferred either B or C, it would have shown
only 6 direct responses (in AB or AC trials, respectively), 3
sequential responses (B, in half of BA trials; C, in half of CA
trials), and 15 irrelevant responses. However, if a marmoset pre-
ferred A, it would have shown 12 direct responses (6 for BA and
6 for CA), 6 sequential responses (half of [AB  AC]  6), and
6 irrelevant responses.
We therefore have to split our analysis into the hypothetical case
that a subject had a preference for Box A and the other hypothet-
ical case that a subject had a preference for either Box B or Box C.
In Test 9, 7 subjects showed a pattern of searches that does not
deviate significantly from a preference for one specific location.
Only Pooh and Theresa directed their choices to the baited box.
Discussion
The 11 common marmosets that participated in a series of object
permanence tests produced quite ambiguous results. The nine tests
posed different problems to different subjects, but we cannot find
any systematic trends therein. The marmosets lived at different
locations, went through the tests in different orders of sequences,
and were of different sex and age, but none of these factors had a
significant or obvious influence on the performances on test.
The high variation in the data was most likely due to interindi-
vidual differences in the comprehension of the tasks. Therefore,
without focusing on the individual level in this experiment, we
cannot find a definitive answer to the question of what the upper
level of object permanence in marmosets is. The very high scores
of correct choices on visible and invisible displacements of at least
2 subjects suggest surprisingly high object permanence abilities in
this species, but the failures of others indicate that this ability is not
shared by all members of the species. In the interpretation of the
data, we must therefore address two questions: (a) On the one
hand, we have to consider reasons why some subjects had such
great problems coping with the tasks; (b) on the other hand, we
need also to discuss why some subjects achieved very high scores
in those tasks and whether these performances reliably show object
permanence abilities up to high Piagetian levels.
First, it is worrisome that marmosets only found the food in
57.5% of the trials in Test 1, which should be a relatively simple
test. This poor result may call into question the whole validity of
the study. The bad performances might be due partly to incomplete
accommodation to the experimental conditions (note that Group 1,
for which Test 1 was the very first test, achieved a mean of 6.2
correct choices out of 12; whereas Group 2, for which Test 1 was
the fifth test, achieved a mean of 7.8 correct choices out of 12) and
to other unknown external factors. Although we mentioned reach-
ing difficulties, we must nevertheless take into account that errors
were made relatively often in choosing the center box, Box B.
With regard to the validity of the whole experiment, we have to
consider that the performance of most subjects was reestablished
on the following test. Vitus, for instance, made only 3 correct
responses out of 12 trials in Test 1 but was correct in all 9 trials of
Table 6
Type of Search Performed by Each Subject in Test 4
Subject Direct Sequential Irrelevant
2(2,
N  24) p
Bianca 11 6 7 4.21 ns
Carunt 10 3 11 0.83 ns
Devil 13 1 10 5.71 ns
Diabolo 10 3 11 0.83 ns
Dublett 11 4 9 1.88 ns
Mandela 15 0 9 10.88 .01
Niko 10 2 12 1.50 ns
Pooh 15 2 7 9.21 .01
Shuto 10 6 8 2.83 ns
Theresa 15 2 7 9.21 .01
Vitus 7 3 14 0.71 ns
Note. The subjects underwent 24 searches. The distribution of searches
among the hiding locations expected if the subjects had shown a preference
for one specific location is 8 for direct searches, 4 for sequential searches,
and 12 for irrelevant searches. In addition, the values of the chi-square
goodness-of-fit tests assessing the degree of correspondence between the
observed and expected observations in each category are shown.
Table 7
Type of Search Performed by Each Subject in Test 9
Subject Direct Sequential Irrelevant
2(2,
N  24) p
Preference for Box Aa
Bianca 10 6 8 1.00 ns
Carunt 9 4 11 5.58 ns
Devil 7 4 13 10.92 .01
Diabolo 12 5 7 0.33 ns
Dublett 10 3 11 6.00 .05
Mandela 10 4 10 3.67 ns
Niko 9 2 13 11.58 .01
Pooh 19 0 5 10.25 .01
Shuto 8 2 14 14.67 .01
Theresa 14 1 9 6.00 .05
Vitus 7 3 14 14.25 .01
Preference for either Box B or Box Cb
Bianca 10 6 8 8.93 .01
Carunt 9 4 11 2.90 ns
Devil 7 4 13 0.77 ns
Diabolo 12 5 7 11.60 .01
Dublett 10 3 11 3.73 ns
Mandela 10 4 10 4.67 ns
Niko 9 2 13 2.10 ns
Pooh 19 0 5 37.83 .01
Shuto 8 2 14 1.07 ns
Theresa 14 1 9 14.40 .01
Vitus 7 3 14 0.23 ns
Note. The subjects underwent 24 searches. In addition, the values of the
chi-square goodness-of-fit tests assessing the degree of correspondence
between the observed and expected observations in each category are
shown.
a The distribution of searches among the hiding locations expected if the
subjects had shown a preference for one specific location is 12 for direct
searches, 6 for sequential searches, and 6 for irrelevant searches. b The
distribution expected if the subjects had shown a preference for one
specific location is 6 for direct searches, 3 for sequential searches, and 15
for irrelevant searches.
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Test 2. Note also that de Blois and Novak (1994) reported a very
similar finding with rhesus monkeys. Of 3 monkeys of their Group
2, 1 made only 1 correct response (corresponds to the chance
probability) and 2 made no correct response in Test 1 (which was
the same task as our Test 1). In summary, there is no reason to
assume that the monkeys’ poor performance in Test 1 reflects a
failure to search for hidden food.
The analysis of the subjects’ performances showed that there is
a further reason for the overall variability. The subjects showed
substantial inconsistencies across tests. This is particularly salient
in those subjects that achieved a total score over all tests above
60.0% correct choices (chance level  33.3%). Theresa, who
showed significant scores in eight tests, failed completely in Test
7, in which she showed only one correct response. Pooh, who was
significantly correct in seven tests, made only two correct choices
in Test 2. Bianca, who performed at chance level in Tests 3 and 5,
grasped the baited box in Test 7 only once. A very bad perfor-
mance in Test 7 was also shown by Diabolo and Dublett.
The common feature of all those surprisingly bad performances
of the clever subjects is that they occurred in tests in which the
experimenter exchanged the position of the baited box with respect
to the preceding test (Tests 2 and 7). Because in the preceding test
the food was hidden 12 times under the same box, it seems as if the
subjects had difficulties shifting their attention to the opposite
location. Or, they might have developed a win–stay/lose–shift
strategy (MacDonald, Pang, & Gibeault, 1994), as it has been
described for a number of mammalian species (Olton, Handel-
mann, & Walker, 1981): Always try the response that was last
rewarded, and if that is no longer rewarded, shift to another
response. In fact, 3 of the 5 subjects had chosen the correct box in
more than 83.0% of those tests that preceded the tests with abrupt
declines (Tests 1 and 6, respectively).
The ups and downs of the other marmosets are more difficult to
interpret. Carunt, for instance, was excellent in Tests 1 and 2 but
chose the correct box less than would be expected by chance in
Tests 5–7. In Test 8, he again showed an excellent performance.
Preferences for specific locations or specific boxes are obvious
factors that affect the object permanence behavior. Most subjects
showed preferences for a specific box. Only the 2 very successful
subjects, Pooh and Theresa, showed no preferences at all in the
successive displacement tasks (Tests 4 and 9).
A further important requirement for appropriate search behavior
in object permanence tasks is a sufficient amount of attention
toward the experimenter’s hiding manipulations. Because the tasks
require the monkeys to figure out the relevant from the irrelevant
objects and events, it makes high demands on attention processes.
In successive displacement tasks, the manipulation of up to three
boxes seemed to have affected the subjects’ ability to visually
follow the entire displacement of the object.
Finally, object permanence tasks may be interpreted as recall-
memory tasks (e.g., Dumas & Wilkie, 1995), with specific de-
mands for the short-term memory during searching. Because sub-
jects sometimes remained sitting for a while or turned away before
reaching out to grasp a box, the time delay might have exceeded a
critical length of the short-term memory.
Despite the obvious difficulties of most subjects to cope with the
tasks presented in this study, the results allow us to address the
question of the upper limit of object permanence in common
marmosets. In the Piagetian six-stage developmental schema, the
ability to solve visible displacement tasks begins in Stage 4 and is
fully functional in Stage 5. Understanding invisible displacements
develops during Stage 6. Whatever the reasons for the interindi-
vidual variances and for the fluctuations of performance across
tests were, the results showed that all subjects demonstrated object
permanence ability at Stage 4 and most of them also at Stage 5.
The performance of at least 2 subjects (Pooh and Theresa) that
achieved very high scores not only in most of the tests but
particularly in the most critical ones (with the exception of Test 5)
suggests that this species is in principle able to represent the
existence and the movements of unperceived objects, thereby
demonstrating object permanence at Stage 6.
Nevertheless, firm conclusions about Stage 6 abilities do require
converging results from different experimental approaches. The
specific procedure in this study has been used for reasons of
comparison to other studies, but it might not be the most appro-
priate one for common marmosets. For instance, it is possible that
common marmosets, like monkeys in general, have difficulties in
tasks that require long and close interactions with a human exper-
imenter (de Blois et al., 1998). Support for this conclusion comes
from the fact that the best performers in this experiment are also
the particularly tame and curious subjects in the groups, Pooh and
Theresa.
Furthermore, to figure out if the interindividual differences are
bound to the specific requirements of the present tasks or to more
general cognitive differences, we should test the subjects in other
tasks too. In fact, subjects Pooh and Theresa have proved to be
quick learners in other experiments as well (Voelkl & Huber,
2000). However, that the invisible displacement tasks are solved
by only a few individuals should not come as a big surprise if one
considers these tasks at the upper limit of common marmoset
intelligence. This would lead to the conclusion that only few very
intelligent or particularly experienced monkeys achieve Stage 6
abilities but that Stage 5 abilities are shared by most members of
this species.
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